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IMPERIAL AND IMPERILED: THE CURIOUS STATE OF THE
EXECUTIVE
SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH*

ABSTRACT
In the last four decades, the presidency has been characterized
both as the "imperialpresidency" as well as the "imperiledpresidency. "From an originalistperspective, both camps have elements of
truth on their side. When it comes to the conduct and initiation of
wars, modern Presidentsexercise powers that rival those the Crown
possessed in England. Presidents claim the power to start wars,
notwithstanding Congress's power to declare war. Moreover,
Presidents insist that they have the sole right to determine how the
armed forces will wage all wars, even though Congress clearly has
considerablepower over the armed forces. Law execution provides a
fascinatingcontrast. The original Constitutionestablisheda single
chief executive, empowered to execute all federal laws through
subordinateexecutive officers. Over the course of almost a century
and a half, Congresses have splintered the President's executive
power, committing slivers of it to numerous independentagencies. In
other words, alongsidethe Constitution'sunitaryexecutive, a number
of independent executive councils have emerged. Hence the President
is imperial in some respects and imperiled in others.

* Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego. This piece is an outgrowth
of the James Gould Cutler lecture delivered at William and Mary in early 2008. My gratitude
to President Taylor Reveley, Dean Lynda Butler, and the faculty of William and Mary for
inviting me to give the lecture. Thanks to Steve Smith for comments and Neal Devins for
helpful conversations.
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Over three decades ago, in the midst of Watergate, Arthur
1
Schlesinger argued that America had an "imperial presidency."
Though this apprehension waned in the late 1970s and 1980s, many
members of the intelligentsia have sounded a fresh alarm, warning
that America once again has an imperial presidency.2 Critics of the
George W. Bush administration have excoriated it for, among other
3
things, wiretapping in supposed contravention of federal law,
employing coercive interrogation techniques,4 and its announced
policy of not abiding by statutory provisions it deems unconstitutional.' Some of the criticism has been rather pungent. Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid has described President Bush as "a
6
loser and a liar" and has derided him as another '"Kng George." Mr.
Reid subsequently apologized-but only, he likes to point out, for
calling the President a 'loser."' Bruce Fein, a conservative legal
commentator, opined that "Mr. Bush would have quarreled with
every indictment against King George III penned by Thomas
Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence because it contradicted
his monarch-like theory of a unitary executive."8 President George
W. Bush occasionally has added fuel to the fire. "I'm the commander-see, I don't need to explain-I do not need to explain why
I say things. That's the interesting thing about being the presi9
dent.... I don't feel like I owe anybody an explanation." This
attitude seemed to have a touch of regal hauteur to it, bringing to
mind President Richard Nixon's far more imperial claim from the
1970s. 10
1. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973) (Replica Books
1998).
2. PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS: How THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE
CONSTITUTION 272 (2005); ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AFTER WATERGATE 261 (2005); FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIE Z.
HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 7 (2007)
("Today, the President also deploys the monarchical executive theory ....").
3. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 2, at 203.
4. RUDALEVIGE, supra note 2, at 228-29.
5. Id. at 229.
6. David M. Herszenhorn, Reid's Chilly Relationship with Bush Enters a Deep Freeze,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, at A20.
7. Id.
8. Bruce Fein, Can the Republic Survive?, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Nov. 27, 2007, at A16.
9. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 145-46 (2002).
10. I am referring to Nixon's curious claim that "[w]hen the president does it, that means
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Of course, there is nothing truly new here. Criticisms that the
President has adopted monarchical trappings and attitudes are as
American as apple pie. Indeed, such complaints were common even
before there was a President. " In The Federalist No. 67, Alexander
Hamilton rebuked those who had exaggerated the President's
constitutional powers in a bid to defeat the Constitution. 2 His
amusing comments are worth recounting today:
[C]alculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, they
have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions
in opposition to the intended President of the United States; not
merely as the embryo, but as the full-grown progeny of that
detested parent. To establish the pretended affinity they have
not scrupled to draw resources even from the regions of fiction....
He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and
splendor to those of a king of Great-Britain. He has been shown
to us with the diadem sparkling on his brow, and the imperial
purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a throne
surrounded with minions and mistresses; giving audience to the
envoys of foreign potentates, in all the supercilious pomp of
majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness
have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene. We
have been almost taught to tremble at the terrific visages of
murdering janizaries; and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of
a future seraglio. 3
This pattern of inveighing against alleged presidential pretensions
and usurpations continued after ratification, with polemicists taking
unwarranted potshots at America's Cincinnatus. 4 Thomas Jefferson's friends in the press claimed that George Washington and his
Federalist allies were attempting to create a monarchy. 5 Much

that it is not illegal." WATERGATE AND AFTERWARD: THE LEGACY OF RIcHARD M. NIXON 328
(Leon Friedman & William F. Levantrosser eds., 1992).
11. CATO, To THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK IV,reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 113, 115 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter ANTI-FEDERALIST]; THE
IMPARTIAL EXAMINER, UNTITLED 11 JUNE 1778, reprintedin 5 ANTI-FEDERALIST 194, 197.
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
13. Id. at 452-53.
14. STANLEY ELKINS & Emic MCKITRIcK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 360-61 (1993).
15. Id.
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was deemed a dictator and Franklin D.
later, Abraham Lincoln
16
worse.
far
Roosevelt
Such criticism of the executive branch is entirely healthy.
Citizens who disagree with an administration's policies undoubtedly
will voice vigorous criticisms and often will be prone to exaggerate
the administration's defects. Moreover, members of the other
branches, competing as they do for power and influence, naturally
will take the President to task for supposedly overstepping his
constitutional bounds.
What is perhaps of more recent vintage is the movement
amongst some scholars and politicians to check the supposed
trespasses by Congress upon the presidency. To be sure, there have
been periodic calls to strengthen the presidency, such as the
Brownlow Committee's administrative reforms proposed in the late
1930s. 1 7 But what is seemingly new is the sense amongst some that
Congress has subdued, even shackled the presidency.18 In the early
1980s, President Gerald Ford expressed this view with some
exasperation, declaring that "[w]e have not an imperial Presidency
but an imperiled Presidency."1 9
The diminishment of the presidency perhaps began in the late
part of the nineteenth century with the creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.2" Over the course of the next century,
Congress sought to make many fields of civil law execution independent of the President. This tendency to create independent
executive fiefdoms seemed to accelerate and deepen after the
Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. 2 ' Congress not only
continued to create independent agencies charged with executing
the law (such as the Federal Election Commission), but it also
enacted all manner of statutes that sought to curb the perceived
16. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: ABRAHAM LINCOLN

AND FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 15-16 (1988).
17. JAY M. SHAFRITZ, DICTIONARY OF PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINSTRATION 28-29 (2004).
18. See generally HAROLD M. BARGER, THE IMPOSSIBLE PRESIDENCY: ILLUSIONS AND
REALITIES OF EXECUTIVE POWER (1984); THOMAS FRANCK, THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY:
CONGRESSIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE POWER (1980); THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY:

LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds.,
1989); THE POST-IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (Vincent Davis ed., 1980).
19. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 425.
20. See ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 19 (1941).

21. See C. Boyden Gray, Special Interests, Regulation, and the Separationof Powers, in
THE FETERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 18, at 213.

1026

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1021

excesses of presidential law execution.22 The Impoundment Control
Act, the Ethics in Government Act, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, the Hughes-Ryan Act-all of these and many
others are the byproducts of that era's profound distrust of
Presidents.2 3
Prominent members of the George W. Bush administration share
the view that Congress has unduly hampered the presidency. Vice
President Dick Cheney has said that "[i]n the aftermath of Vietnam
and Watergate ... there was a concerted effort to place limits and
restrictions on presidential authority ........
These efforts "were
misguided .... In other remarks, the Vice President has said he
believes "in a strong, robust executive authority," and that "the
world we live in demands it "26 He further claimed that "we have
an obligation as an administration to pass on the offices we hold to
our successors in as good of shape as we found them."2 7 Sounding a
note of optimism, Cheney claimed "that to some extent now, we've
been able to restore the legitimate authority of the presidency."2
In comments on the scandal surrounding President Bill Clinton's
pardons of Marc Rich and others, President Bush has said he was
"mindful not only of preserving executive powers for [him] self, but
for predecessors as well., 29 For this reason (and perhaps others), the
22. See id.; Theodore B. Olson, The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of
PresidentialAuthority, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 18, at 225-42.
23. Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 332; Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783; Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93559, 88 Stat. 1795.
24. James Taranto, A Strong Executive: Does Watergate's Legacy Hinder the War on
Terror?, OPINION J., Jan. 28, 2006, http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=
110007885.
25. Id.
26. Richard W. Stevenson, Cheney Says 9/11 Changedthe Rules, INT'LHERALD TRIB., Dec.
21, 2005, at 1.
27. Press Release, The White House, Vice President's Remarks to the Traveling Press
(Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/200512209.html [hereinafter Vice President's Remarks]. Other commentators demur, arguing that the
Administration's unilateral approach to interbranch disputes and the conduct of warfare
ultimately will leave the presidency weaker and not stronger. See generally JACK L.
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (2007).

28. Vice President's Remarks, supra note 27.
29. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President in Question and Answer
Session with the Press (Jan. 29,2001), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
20010129-7.html.
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President did not want an investigation opened into the particulars
of President Clinton's flurry of last-minute pardons.3 ° Certain
decisions of President Bush, such as executive orders that gave prior
Presidents a veto on the release of certain of their administrations'
documents, certainly seem designed to respect (and perhaps
enhance) the prerogatives of past Presidents. 3 By augmenting the
power of past Presidents to restrain the release of documents, Bush
undoubtedly understood that he likewise was enhancing his own
authority to prevent the release of his administration's papers once
he leaves office.
I will not try to referee the dispute between those who think the
presidency has become too muscular and those who regard it as
entirely too frail. At some level, saying that the President has
become overbearing and all-powerful is a little like saying that a cup
of coffee is too bitter. To a degree, it is a matter of preference,
making it a matter upon which reasonable people can disagree.
Some people prefer strong Presidents who will cut through political
impasses and take decisive action. Others prefer Presidents who are
more passive and deferential to Congress, the courts, or the public.
Additionally, criticism of a particular President often reflects the
partisan sensibilities of the critics. People frequently look the other
way when a co-partisan takes some controversial action even if they
might have criticized the practice when done by politicians of
another party. For instance, few legal scholars criticized President
Clinton's decision to wage war on Serbia even though there were
many who had vociferously opposed previous presidential wars.3 2
One must suppose that partisan identification with President
Clinton coupled with approval of America's participation in the
Balkans War accounts for the remarkable silence. Similarly, the
dearth of Republican oversight during the early years of the
George W. Bush administration is likely attributed, at least in
part, to an unwise adherence to President Ronald Reagan's "l1th
Commandment-Thou shalt not speak ill of another Republican."3 3
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 5, 2001) (amending the
1978 Presidential Records Act).
32. See John Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the MultilateralFuture, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1673, 1685-86 (2000) (noting the curious silence).
33. REAGAN: A LIFE IN LETTERS 591 (Kiron K. Skinner et al. eds., 2003).
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Now that a Democrat will occupy the White House, the Republican
members of Congress undoubtedly will revert to a dogged defense
of congressional prerogatives. One also can foresee that Democratic
congressmen will be more prone to turning a blind eye towards the
alleged improprieties and usurpations of President Barack Obama.
Because arguments about whether we groan under the strain of
an imperial presidency necessarily will reflect different conceptions
about the ideal features of the executive branch, and because
individuals will be tempted to look the other way when their copartisans are in power, I want to eschew any baseline that merely
reflects either my own opinion of the optimal features and traits of
the presidency or my own attitude regarding the merits of any
particular occupant. Instead, this Article judges whether modern
Presidents have usurped constitutional powers using the more fixed
standard of the Constitution's original meaning. Have Presidents
assumed congressional powers in a form of interbranch imperialism? Or has Congress, the "impetuous vortex" of which Madison
warned, 4 usurped presidential powers as part of its general
tendency to seize (or shackle) power rightly belonging to others?
Of course, any attempt to use the original conception of the
presidency as a baseline is subject to a whole host of serious
objections. Some will observe that the original understanding of
particular provisions in Article II is (and has always been) rather
contested.35 Others will insist that the original understanding of
various Article II provisions is unknowable, arguing that phrases
like "executive power" and "[c]ommander in [c]hief" are simply
inscrutable.36 In his famous Youngstown opinion, Justice Robert
Jackson made both of these points when he claimed that the
conflicting historical evidence "cancels each other" and lamented
that "[j]ust what our forefathers did envision, or would have
envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined
from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called
upon to interpret for Pharaoh.""

34. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
35. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
36. Id. at 641.
37. Id. at 634.

20081

THE CURIOUS STATE OF THE EXECUTIVE

1029

Although such limitations and concerns must be kept in mind, it
does seem possible to reconstruct the Founders' vision regarding the
President's powers over war and law execution. This relatively
narrow focus makes the treatment more manageable and hopefully
more interesting
because these two areas provide a remarkable
38
contrast.
In matters of war, Presidents have become hyper-Commanders in
Chief, able to start wars at will and deeply resistant to, and even
indignant about, legislative interference. 39 Believing that they were
ultimately responsible for safeguarding the nation, the past few
Presidents have insisted upon a right to start wars as a means of
promoting national security.4 ° This is a far cry from the original
conception of the President. Though the President was a powerful
and supreme military commander, he had no power to take the
nation to war. He could not start wars; indeed, he could not even
conduct offensive operations after another nation had declared war
on the United States. Furthermore, Congress enjoyed sweeping
power over the military and determined the manner of fighting
wars, the placement of troops and naval vessels, and the proper
military targets in times of war. Because Congress enjoyed broad
authority over war and military matters, the Constitution did not
grant the Commander in Chief any exclusive powers over the
military.
In matters of law execution, by contrast, the President is no
longer what members of the founding generation called a "supreme
executive."'" Instead, recent Presidents have acquiesced to the
perpetuation of what is best described as an enervated, splintered
executive. Rather than the President serving as a true chief
executive, the current situation is more aptly described as one in
which there is one chief executive with limited law enforcement
38. Hence, I will not discuss the President's powers over foreign affairs or his influence
over legislation. Michael Ramsey and I have previously written that the modern presidency's
powers over foreign affairs are largely consistent with the original understanding. See
Michael Ramsey & Saikrishna Prakash, The Executive Power over ForeignAffairs, 111 YALE
L.J. 231 (2001).
39. LOuis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 215 (2004).
40. IRONS, supra note 2, at 265-66.
41. See Landholder VI, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE

CONSTITUTION 487, 489 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1976) (stating that the "supreme
executive should be one person and unfettered, otherwise than by the laws he is to execute").
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jurisdiction and a host of plural executive committees, each with
a narrow but still important jurisdiction. This is far removed from
the founding conception of the President. At the founding, individuals uniformly read the Constitution as empowering the President
to execute all laws himself. Moreover, most believed that the
Constitution permitted the President to direct and control the
executive officers-those who executed the law. The powers to
execute the law and control executive officers flowed from the grant
of executive power. Using these powers, the founding generation
expected that Presidents would ensure a uniform, just, vigorous,
and prompt enforcement of federal statutes.
So we have a curious state of affairs, in which the President is
imperial in some respects and imperiled in others. It would seem
that both Gerald Ford and Arthur Schlesinger were right, in a
manner of speaking.
I. THE HYPER-COMMANDER: WAR POWERS AND THE STORY OF
PRESIDENTIAL AGGRANDIZEMENT

War powers scholarship of the last four decades has tended to
criticize modern Presidents for acting at variance with the original
understanding.4 2 Though the discussion below generally agrees with
that critique, it also differs in important respects. First, most prior
considerations have focused on what various founders said about
the Constitution's allocation of war powers during the founding
era.43 As my colleague Michael Ramsey has pointed out, surprisingly
little attention has been paid to the text of particular constitutional
provisions and the original understanding thereof." For instance,
when discussing whether the President could start wars, scholars
have spent little time trying to discern the meaning of the phrase
"declare war," content to quote the numerous founders who denied
that the President could start a war.4 5 The treatment below makes
claims about the meaning of constitutional text. Among other
42. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb-Framingthe Problem, Doctrine,and Original Understanding,121 HARV. L. REV.
689 (2008); Michael Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002).
43. See Ramsey, supra note 42, at 1549-51.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 1549-50.
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things, I argue that the Constitution's grant to Congress of the
power to "declare war" means that only Congress may decide
whether the nation will wage war. Moreover, Congress's many
powers over war and military powers cede Congress sweeping
powers over all war and military matters.
Second, previous scholarly criticisms of presidential power
actually have overstated the President's powers over wars and the
military.4" One common feature of many accounts is that although
only Congress may decide to take the nation to war, the President
has constitutional control over some or all aspects of the conduct of
the war.4" In particular, as David Barron and Martin Lederman
recently pointed out, numerous scholars have assumed that
Congress cannot regulate the conduct of the war, as such power is
granted exclusively to the Commander in Chief.48 In fact, under the
original understanding, someone who was a "commander in chief"
enjoyed no area of autonomy with respect to military operations.4"
Consistent with this view of the Commander in Chiefs power,
early Congresses repeatedly regulated military operations all the
time, including battlefield operations." Hence, when critics of
executive dominance of warmaking concede that the Constitution
affirmatively grants the President some autonomy when it comes
to military operations, they concede too much, at least from the
perspective of the original Constitution.
A. OriginalFramework: The ConstrainedCommander in Chief
The Constitution largely replicates the system that prevailed
under the Articles of Confederation. To be sure, the Constitution
sometimes uses different words, but the allocation of powers is
much the same. As under the Articles, Congress may decide
whether the nation will wage war.51 Likewise, Congress determines
whether to have an army and navy and how they will be equipped.5"
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, supra note 42, at 751 n.191.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 82, 90-95 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Id.
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Finally, Congress may direct the operations of the armed forces.5"
Considered together, these robust powers establish that there is no
subject matter related to war and the military that is outside of
Congress's reach.
Consider the "declare war" power. In the eighteenth century, this
much-remarked-upon power was understood to consist principally
of the power to decide to go to war. Any decision to go to war,
whether or not expressed via a formal declaration of war, was seen
as a decision to declare war.54 Sir Robert Walpole, the first English
Prime Minister, noted in the mid-eighteenth century that England
typically declared war via "the Mouths of [her] Cannons." 5 Other
Europeans, including monarchs, legislators, judges, and diplomats,
likewise spoke of nations declaring war via their hostilities or
hostile actions.5 No less than King George III observed that because
France had attacked English naval vessels, France had declared
war against England.5 7
The signals that served as declarations of war were quite varied.
Nations might declare war via an invasion, with a naval attack,
or by a host of seemingly innocuous statements or actions that
were seen as declarations of war. Prior to the eighteenth century,
"throwing down a gauntlet" (an armored glove) served as a declaration of war in Europe.5 8 During the eighteenth century, Tripoli
declared war by cutting down the enemy's flag.59 Given the right
context, withdrawing one's ambassador (or dismissing another
nation's) might serve as a declaration of war because it signaled a
break in diplomatic relations and that the time for parleying had
ended. °
Americans likewise understood that certain informal signals
commonly served as declarations of war. John Adams, who had
53. Id.
54. STEPHEN C. NEFF, LAW AND THE WAR OF NATIONS 110 (2005).
55. 10 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: SECOND PARLIAMENT
OF GEORGE II, FOURTH SESSION (May 12, 1738), available at http://www.britishhistory.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=37805.
56. See NEFF, supra note 54, at 108-09.
57. Letter from the King to Lord North (July 18, 1778), in 4 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF
KING GEORGE THE THIRD FROM 1760 TO DECEMBER 1783, at 180 (John Fortescue ed., 1928).
58. See NEFF, supra note 54, at 72.
59. See JOSHUA E. LONDON, VICTORY IN TRIPOLI 95 (2005).
60. Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by
"DeclareWar,"93 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 73 (2007).
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served as the nation's ambassador to France, noted that both
England and France had used hostilities to declare war against
each other during the Revolutionary War, and (correctly) predicted
that there would be no other declaration of war."1 Similarly,
Americans recognized that when certain Native American tribes
beheaded the soldiers of another nation, they thereby declared
war. 2 Finally, Americans, recounting the events in Europe during
the Revolutionary War, repeatedly noted that wars could be
declared via various hostile signals such as aiding a warring nation,
recognizing the independence of rebel subjects, and seizing another
nation's property."
By conveying to Congress the power to declare war, the
Constitution implicitly, but nonetheless undeniably, grants
Congress a monopoly on the decision to go to war. Indeed, early
commentators uniformly agreed that the President could not take
the nation to war because the Constitution granted the power to
declare war exclusively to Congress.' For instance, in 1795,
Professor James Kent observed that "war can only be commenced by
an act or resolution of congress ....
"
As one might expect, early Presidents well understood that the
grant of the declare war power to Congress meant that they could
not declare war. To begin with, they recognized that they could not
unilaterally issue a formal declaration of war.66 Indeed, no President
has ever claimed such authority. 7 More generally, early Presidents
likewise realized that the Constitution barred them from taking
any action that was considered a declaration of war.6" For this
reason, George Washington refused to authorize offensive operations against certain Native American tribes that had declared war
61. Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams (Feb. 14, 1779), in 3 THE REVOLUTIONARY

DIPLOMATIc CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 47, 48 (Francis Wharton ed., Wash.,
D.C., Gov't Printing Office 1889).
62. Prakash, supra note 60, at 78.
63. See Saikrishna Prakash, Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declarationof War, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2008).
64. Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Separationand Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87

TEX. L. REV. 299, 313-15 (2008).
65. JAMES KENT, DISSERTATION: BEING THE PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LAW
LECTURES 66 (1795).
66. See Ramsey, supra note 42, at 1550-51.
67. See Prakash, supra note 64, at 314-15.
68. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
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against the United States.6 9 'The Constitution vests the power of
declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of
importance can be undertaken until after they shall have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure."7 In
Washington's view (and in the opinion of his Cabinet), to have
authorized offensive operations against the Native American tribes
would have been to declare war upon them.7 '
The declare war power not only grants Congress the power to
decide whether to go to war, but it also grants Congress the power
to control all those decisions and functions that are normally
associated with a declaration of war. As I recount in a recent piece,
formal declarations of war were not simple, one-sentence documents
that did no more than declare war.72 Instead, they typically were
complex and detailed, laying down rules related to the status of
treaties, the rights of enemy nationals resident within the
declarant's territory, and the types of enemy property that were
subject to capture.7" Because Congress has the power to declare war,
it has the power to establish rules related to these subject matters,
and the right to expect that its rules will be honored as the supreme
law of the land, whatever state law or the President might say to
the contrary.
Additional powers related directly to the use of force and the
capture of enemy property-specifically, the powers to grant letters
of marque and reprisal and to make capture rules-were likewise
understood to grant Congress a monopoly with which the President
could not interfere.74 In early naval wars, Congress granted the
President the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal,7 5
suggesting that the President lacked such power under the
Constitution. Relatedly, an early Supreme Court opinion, Little v.
Barreme,76 concluded that the President could not supplement
69. Id.; Letter from George Washington to William Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), availableat
http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw330067)) (for a scan of
the original letter, follow the "IMAGES" hyperlink).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Prakash, supra note 63.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
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Congress's capture rules, thereby indicating that the President
v
lacked the constitutional power to create capture rules on his own."
Finally, even Alexander Hamilton, often regarded as having a
rather pro-executive conception of presidential power, acknowledged
that the President had no power to order the capture of alien
property. Indeed, he reached this conclusion in the face of a French
naval war against American shipping.7"
Other powers the Constitution grants to Congress-including,
most prominently, the power to make rules for the government and
regulation of the armed forces--cede Congress complete (although
not exclusive) control over the armed forces.7" Using its authority,
early Congresses specified where ships would patrol during
times of war, what enemy vessels were proper military targets,
and such mundane things as the uniform method of loading and
firing muskets.' Early Congresses even regulated the treatment of
prisoners. Sometimes, they required the President to keep prisoners safe.8 ' Other times, they authorized the torture and execution
of prisoners in retaliation for the mistreatment meted out to
Americans. 2
These claims of sweeping congressional power over war and military matters will strike some as quite dubious. After all, Article II
of the Constitution famously makes the President the Commander
in Chief. 3 Is the Commander in Chief meant to be a potted plant,
incapable of making meaningful military decisions? Of course not.
As Commander in Chief, the President enjoys substantial power
over the military. A 1778 military dictionary defined he "that
commands [the army] in chief' as someone who may
regulate the march of the army, and their encampment, ... visit
the posts, ... command parties for intelligence, ... give out the
in day of battle, he chuses [sic] the most advantageous
orders ...
ground, makes the disposition of his army, posts the artillery,
77. Id. at 177-78.
78. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 17, 1798), in 21 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 461, 461-62 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.14.

80. See Prakash, supra note 63.
81. See, e.g., Act of July 6, 1812, 2 Stat. 777.
82. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1813, 2 Stat. 829.
83. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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and sends his orders.... At a siege, he ... orders the making of
[defensive fortifications] and making the attacks.8
There is little doubt about the significance of such authorities,
because Presidents may make such decisions across all theaters of
war.
Yet, notwithstanding their tremendous power over military
operations, commanders in chief by no means enjoyed unlimited or
exclusive power. Commanders in chief were never thought to have
the power to declare war, raise armies, or fund them.85 Moreover,
commanders in chief were never thought to have exclusive operational control over their units.8" Although the powers of commanders
in chief are significant, these powers did not guarantee any sphere
of autonomy or independent decisionmaking. In particular, others,
both civilian and military, directed commanders in chief.
The experiences in England and America prove as much. In
the Anglo-American tradition, commanders in chief always have
been under the control of others. In England, there were regional
commanders in chief and sub-commanders in chief of various
units, none of whom had any operational autonomy." In America,
the same relationship held true. During the colonial era, there
were multiple commanders in chief, all subordinate to superior
commanders and the Crown." More relevant, the nation had a
congressionally appointed Commander in Chief during the
Revolutionary War who commanded under the direction of the
Continental Congress. 89 In 1775, Congress appointed George
Washington as Commander in Chief.' Notwithstanding his ap84. A MuLITARY DICTIONARY, EXPLAINING AND DESCRIBING THE TECHNICAL TERMS,
PHRASES, WORKS, AND MACHINES USED IN THE SCIENCE OF WAR, at E3 (1778).
85. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 42, at 1549-53.
86. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
87. See Henry P. Beers, The Papersof the British Commandersin Chief in NorthAmerica,
1754-1783, 13 MILITARY AFF. 79 (1949) (discussing various commanders in chief of North
America); see also OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY 364-65 (David G. Chandler & Ian
Beckett eds., 1994) (discussing commanders in chief for India, Bengal, and Madras).
88. See DAVID RAMSAY, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 11 (Mallory & Co. 1811)
(discussing Washington's role as Commander in Chief of the Virginia militia during the
French and Indian War).
89. See Prakash, supra note 64, at 362-64.
90. 2 JOURNAIS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 96 (Gov't Printing Office

1905).

20081

THE CURIOUS STATE OF THE EXECUTIVE

1037

pointment, however, he was subject to continual congressional
direction in matters large and small throughout the course of the
war.91 Indeed, his commission required as much. 2 No one, least of
all Washington, thought that the Commander in Chief had any
sphere of autonomy vis-a-vis the Continental Congress. 3 Finally,
after the Constitution's ratification, Congress continued to direct the
army and navy, notwithstanding the Constitution's creation of a
more independent Commander in Chief.94 As noted earlier, Congress
directed where vessels could patrol, the types of enemy ships to
attack, and the objectives of various wars. 5
Were there limits on congressional power over war and military
matters? There were meaningful constraints, but almost all of these
were practical and institutional, rather than constitutional in
nature. Congress could have enacted whatever rules it wished, but
it was (and is) constrained by the difficulty of crafting rules in real
time to deal with ongoing battlefield situations. Congress lacked
battlefield information of the type that would be needed to
micromanage particular battlefield operations, like when to fire,
when to advance, and whether to attempt a flanking operation."
Moreover, the deliberative legislative process is clearly ill-suited to
making rules that will apply to ongoing skirmishes. Both chambers
have to pass the same legislation, and then the President has ten
days to decide whether to sign, veto, or allow the bill to become law
with the passage of time.9" Most battles would be long over before
such bills could become law. Finally, the President may veto bills
that he believes micromanage battlefield decisions in ways that are
detrimental to the conduct of the war.9" Such vetoes make it
extremely difficult to specify operational details because Congress
needs a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override the veto. 9
91. Id. (commission requiring Washington to "observe and follow such orders and
directions, from time to time, as you shall receive from this, or a future Congress of these
United Colonies, or committee of Congress').
92. Id.
93. See Ramsey, supra note 42, at 1560 n.61.
94. See Prakash, supra note 64, at 342-45.
95. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
96. Prakash, supra note 64, at 377-79.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.
98. Id. at cl. 3.
99. Id.
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Needless to say, these constraints greatly hamper the capacity of
Congress to dictate particular military operations. Indeed, in almost
all situations it will be impossible for Congress to micromanage
specific battlefield strategies and assets. Often, the most it can do
is enact antecedent, standing rules that try to regulate the conduct
of warfare, whatever the precise circumstances.
The one constitutional constraint upon Congress is that it may
not deprive the President of control over the military. More precisely, Congress cannot establish independent military officers, for
if it did, the President would not be Commander in Chief of the
entire armed forces. What this means in practice is that although
Congress can regulate the armed forces and the use of force in a
host of ways, specifying all manner of rules related to military
training, discipline, and battlefield tactics, it cannot divest the
President of any military discretion that it chooses not to exercise.
In other words, whatever military discretion Congress chooses not
to exercise must be left in the hands of the Commander in Chief.
Early Presidents accepted congressional dominance of war and
military powers. As noted, Washington understood that only
Congress could decide whether the nation would wage war. 10 0 The
same was true of his immediate successors. John Adams recognized
that France was waging a naval war against the United States. 10 '
Nonetheless, he did not imagine that he could decide to wage war in
response. 02 Similarly, Jefferson concluded that Congress would
have to declare war against Tripoli if the United States was to
engage in offensive operations against that nation.' 0 3 Finally,
Madison famously went to Congress to secure a declaration of war
against England, even though he believed that England already was
waging war against the United States. °4 Just as importantly, early
Presidents abided by all the constraints that Congress placed on the
use of military force and the numerous and diverse regulations that
100. See Letter from George Washington, supra note 69.
101. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI WAR 23 (1966).
102. See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 155
(1976).
103. See The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Thomas Jefferson: First Annual Message
to Congress (Dec. 8, 1801), http://avalon.yale.edu/19th-century/Jeffmesl.asp (last visited Nov.
25, 2008).
104. Special Message to Congress (June 1, 1812), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
192 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
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Congress imposed upon the military." 5 No early President ever
claimed that Congress lacked authority to direct military training,
operations, and deployment.'0 °
B. Modern Framework: The Absolute Commander in Chief
The first time a President arguably exceeded his limited war
powers was in the prelude to the Mexican-American War. President
James Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor to defend disputed
territory north of the Rio Grande.'07 No statute of Congress specified
the boundaries of the state of Texas.' °8 Some Whigs, most notably
Abraham Lincoln, argued that President Polk had triggered a war
by moving U.S. troops to the Rio Grande in a manner calculated to
trigger Mexican aggression."°9 Indeed, Lincoln's "Spot Resolutions"
implied that American troops had been sent to territory in Mexico
(and hence not part of the United States)."0
More radical changes in conceptions of presidential war powers
occurred during the Korean War, as Louis Fisher has ably argued
in his book."' In Korea, the President took the nation to war
without first securing congressional authorization to wage war.112
Though President Truman cited United Nations resolutions as his
authority for waging war, "' no U.N. resolution purported to oblige
the United States to wage war in Korea." 4 Ever since then, America
has waged a series of wars, large and small, that Presidents began
without congressional approval: the bombing of Cambodia by
President Nixon, the invasion of Grenada by President Reagan, and
the bombing of Serbia by President Clinton are but examples of a

105. See Prakash, supra note 64, at 303; see also id. at 332-36.
106. See id. at 303; see also id. at 332-36.
107. See The National Archives, Teaching With Documents: Lincoln's Spot Resolutions,
http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/lincoln-resolutions (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
108. See id.
109. See id.; RUTH TENZER FELDMAN, THE MEXIcAN-AMERIcAN WAR 65 (2004).
110. See Lincoln's Spot Resolutions, supra note 107; see also FELDMAN, supra note 109, at
65.
111. FISHER, supra note 39, at 97-100.
112. Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did TrumanAct?, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 21, 33 (1995).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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more general trend." 5 Although Presidents George H.W. Bush and
George W. Bush received congressional authority for their most
famous wars, these were perhaps exceptions to the general trend." 6
Indeed, the latter President's administration claimed constitutional
authority to wage war against Iraq, whether or not Congress
7
authorized that war."
From the perspective of institutional design, perhaps presidential
initiative in warmaking makes sense. Although John Yoo has
argued that the Constitution authorizes the President to start
wars," ' his more persuasive case rests on institutional factors." 9
After all, Congress lacks ready access to diplomatic and military
intelligence, is arguably too focused on parochial matters, and seems
rather disinclined to be the dominant voice when it comes to war. 20
Countering these factors is the intuition that Presidents are more
willing to go to war and may choose to do so out of a sense that
lasting greatness will come only if they achieve military victories
during their time in office.'' Indeed, President George W. Bush's
former press secretary has claimed the President's desire to wage
war on Iraq stemmed in part from a desire to burnish his legacy. 22
Apart from claiming the power to initiate warfare, modern
Commanders in Chief have also asserted that the Constitution bars
Congress from enacting statutes that interfere with presidential
direction of wars. These claims were voiced as early as the mid1950s by President Truman.' 21 Many scholars have endorsed the
115. Id. at 21.
116. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243,
116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
117. See, e.g., Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to the
Deputy Counsel to the President (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
warpowers 925.htm (concluding that because "[dieclaring war is not tantamount to making
war," the President may wage war notwithstanding the Constitution's grant of declare war
authority to Congress).
118. JOHNYOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGNAFFAIRS

AFTER 9/11, at 293-94 (2005).
119. See Jide Nzelibe & John C. Yoo, Rational War and ConstitutionalDesign, 115 YALE
L.J. 2512, 2516-19, 2525 (2006).
120. Id. at 2524-25.
121. See William M. Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power To Declare War, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 695, 700-01 (1997).
122. ScOr MCCLELLAN, WHAT HAPPENED 130 (2008).
123. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb-A ConstitutionalHistory, 121 HARv.L. REv. 941, 1055-63 (2008).
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Chief has exclusive authority over
notion that the Commander 12in
4
certain operational matters.
Recently, such claims came into stark relief with the publication
of an Office of Legal Counsel memo claiming that Congress could
not prohibit the use of coercive interrogation techniques by the
armed forces.' 2 5 The memo began by noting that Congress certainly
could not dictate battlefield tactics and then drew an analogy to the
treatment of prisoners.' If Congress could not dictate the former,
then it could not regulate the latter, the memo argued.'2 7 Although
many have condemned the memo's legal reasoning,'2 8 few disagree
with the premise that there are limits to Congress's power over
the armed forces. Those who agree that Congress lacks complete
authority over the armed forces are in the unhappy position of
attempting to determine which sorts of regulations are permissible
and which impinge upon the Commander in Chief's constitutional
authority.
The founding generation had no need to worry about this uncertain dividing line. They granted Congress complete authority
over the armed forces, granting the Commander in Chief residual
control.'2 9 When Congress speaks via legislation, the entire armed
forces, including the President, must obey congressional statutes.
Fortunately, the rest of the Constitution makes it difficult (but
not impossible) for Congress effectively to micromanage an ongoing conflict in real time.3 ° So although the Constitution grants
Congress sweeping powers over the military, Congress has limited
institutional and practical ability to direct warmaking the way an
admiral, general, or Commander in Chief might.''
In any event, by repeatedly asserting broad presidential powers
over war and military matters, Presidents have accumulated, as a
124. Id. at 1068-70.
125. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales,
White House Counsel (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/
bybee80102mem.pdf.
126. Id. at 35.
127. Id.
128. See Note, Government Counsel and Their Obligations, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 142123 (2008).
129. See supra notes 66-82 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
131. Id.
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practical matter, absolute powers. Though some members of
Congress periodically attempt to rein in presidential power,'3 2 these
attempts have foundered because Congress as a whole seems
uninterested in taking more responsibility for war and military
decisions. Whatever statutes or frameworks that Congress has
enacted or might enact in the future seem destined to fail, so long
as most federal legislators lack the resolve to hold Presidents
accountable for running afoul of these statutes and congressional
conceptions of the Constitution's allocation of war and military
powers. Like the Constitution itself, statutes and resolutions are but
parchment barriers if there is no will to enforce them.
II. THE ENERVATED, DIVIDED EXECUTIVE: LAW EXECUTION AND
THE STORY OF THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING CHIEF EXECUTIVE

The George W. Bush administration has made the theory of the
"unitary executive" a subject of popular debate. In the minds of
some, the theory has come to mean that the Constitution, properly
understood, grants the President vast and illimitable power over
wars, foreign affairs, and law execution.'3 3 Moreover, the theory is
sometimes understood to suggest that the President can ignore
treaties and statutes and proclaim himself above the Constitution.'3 4
Indeed, it seems that whenever one disagrees with the constitutional claims of President Bush, the unitary executive theory
becomes something of a convenient scapegoat, making it the b~te
135
noire of left-leaning editorial writers and online bloggers.
It is fair to say that the unitary executive theory originally had a
far narrower but still significant compass. In the minds of some who
propounded the theory, it was limited to law execution and referred
to the assertion that because the President alone has the executive
power, he had the constitutional authority to superintend executive

132. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, SenateDemocrats in Bid To Limit U.S. Role in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2007, at A10.

133. See, e.g., Christopher Kelley, Rethinking PresidentialPower-The Unitary Executive
and the George W Bush Presidency (63rd Ann. Meeting of the Midwest Pol. Sci. Ass'n), Apr.
7-10, 2005, at 25, availableat http://www.cageprisoners.comdownloads/kelleypaper.pdf.
134. See id. at 26-27.

135. See, e.g., Elizabeth de la Vega, Big Brother Is Watching You (and Blowing It), SALON,
Jan. 18, 2006, http://www.salon.com/opinion/featurel2006/O1/18/delavega/.
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branch officials in their exercise of statutory discretion.'3 6 In our
explication and defense of the unitary executive theory, Steve
Calabresi and I argued that the President has three authorities
flowing from his grant of executive power: he may execute any
federal law himself, he may direct executive officers in their
execution of federal statutes, and he may remove those executive
officers who fail to follow his orders or fail to live up to his expectations for speedy, efficient, and responsible execution.'3 7
Below I outline the originalist bona fides of the unitary executive
theory, and whether practice, early and recent, squares with this
conception. Although the early years of the Republic hewed closely
to the unitary executive conception, practice diverged dramatically
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The President
no longer can be regarded as a Chief Executive in the sense of
someone empowered to control the execution of all federal law.
Instead, there are many rival centers of executive power, each with
their own executive fiefdom.
A. OriginalFramework: The Supreme Executive
Prior to the Philadelphia Convention, George Washington,
Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and others saw the need
to create a separate executive charged with law execution. In
1780, Hamilton lamented "the want of a proper executive."'3 8 The
Continental Congress was a "deliberative corps" and was neither
suited to meddle with details nor "to play the executive." 39 About
the same time, Washington admonished a friend in Congress that
there must be "more responsibility and permanency in the executive
bodies."'4 ° On the eve of the Convention, Jefferson, who had served
as a delegate in the Continental Congress, thought it best "to
separate in the hands of Congress the Executive and Legislative
The want of [separation] has been the source of more evil
powers ....
136. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower To Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 615 (1994).
137. Id. at 595.
138. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3 1780), in 1 WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 219 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
139. Id.
140. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Dec. 20, 1780), in CHARLES C.
THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, at 64 (1923).
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than we have experienced from any other cause. Nothing is so
embarrassing as the details of execution."' 4 ' Other commentators
sought the creation of a separate chief executive. 42 Noah Webster
said that if "the power of the whole" were "vested in a single person
...
the execution of the laws [would be] vigorous and decisive.' 43
In the Convention's early days, individuals and state delegations
submitted various proposals. 4 4 Each plan called for a separate,
national executive branch. 45 Whatever the attributes of the
executive branch, it would possess the core power to execute the
laws. 4 The Virginia (or Randolph) plan resolved that "a National
Executive be instituted" and "that besides a general authority to
execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation.' 4 v Charles Pinckney's
plan sought a President with "the Ex[ecutive] Authority of the U.S."
Among his duties would be "to attend to the Execution of the Laws
of the U.S."'48
The New Jersey and Hamilton plans had analogous provisions.
The New Jersey plan envisioned Congress electing a plural
executive that would have "general authority to execute the federal
acts ....
,14' If the "carrying into execution" of acts and treaties by
ordinary means proved impossible, the "federal Executive" could call
forth the state militias "to enforce and compel an obedience to such"
acts and treaties. 5 ° Similarly, Hamilton proposed vesting "[t]he
supreme Executive authority of the United States" in a "Governour"
who "serve[d] during good behavior ....
"" Among his other powers,
this "Executive" would have "the execution of all laws passed ....
,'

141. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Aug. 4, 1787), in 1 THE PEOPLE
SHALL JUDGE 321-22 (1976).
142. See HENRY BARRErr LEARNED, THE PRESIDENTS CABINET 51-52 (1912).
143. Id.
144. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
147. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 20, 21 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press
1937).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 244.
150. Id. at 245.
151. Id. at 292.
152. Id.
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After delegates unanimously agreed that the "Nat[ional]
Executive" would consist of one person' 53 and would "carry into
execution the nation[al] laws, 15 4 these resolutions and others were
sent to the Committee of Detail. 5 ' The Committee drafted clauses
that eventually became the Executive Power and Faithful Execution
Clauses,'5 6 thus confirming that the executive had a law execution
power coupled with a correlative duty to ensure that he wielded that
power to ensure a faithful execution.
Indeed, discussion of almost every executive issue presumed
that the executive would be empowered to execute the law.
James Madison noted that "[c]ertain powers were in their nature
Executive, and must be given to that depart[ment], whether
administered by one or more persons ....,,'5 Hence, he sought a
"national Executive" with "power to carry into effect[ ] the national
laws[,] to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and
to execute such other powers ('not Legislative nor Judiciary in their
nature') as may from time to time be delegated by the national
Legislature."'5 8 James Wilson similarly claimed that "executing the
laws" was "strictly Executive."' 5 9
Delegates discussing the selection and tenure of the executive
likewise assumed that the executive would be empowered to execute
the law. Charles Pinckney argued that Congress should select the
executive because it "will be most attentive to the choice of a fit man
to carry [the laws] properly into execution."' 6 ° Later, Madison noted
that the President should not be made dependent upon Congress
lest the latter become "the Executor as well as the maker of laws
....
,,161 Madison also briefly discussed the function of the executive
and judicial branches: '"The latter executed the laws in certain cases
as the former did in others. The former expounded [and] applied
them for certain purposes, as the latter did for others."'6 2
153.
154.
155.
156.

2 id. at 29.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 95, 129, 132.
See id. at 185.

157. 1 id.at 67.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 65-66.
2 id. at 30.
Id. at 34.
Id.
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Even discussions of the veto assumed presidential execution
of the law. The Randolph plan envisioned a Council of Revision
(composed of the President and federal judges) that would exercise
a veto over federal bills.'63 John Dickenson objected to the union of
judges and President, because "the one is the expounder, and the
other the Executor of the Laws."'" Much later, Madison defended
the Council of Revision, noting that if it was improper for judges to
participate in the exercise of the veto because they were to execute
the laws, the argument proved far too much because a purely
executive veto would be improper on the same grounds.1" 5 Armed
with a veto, the executive could shape the very laws he was to
execute.
During the ratification fight, Federalists and Anti-Federalists
voiced similar understandings. First, many noted that the President
could execute the law himself. Second, many individuals more
realistically claimed that the President would superintend the law
execution of executive officers.
Consider those who spoke of the President's ability to serve as
what Hamilton would later call "the Constitutional Executor" of the
laws.' Edmund Randolph, who had opposed the concept of a single
chief executive at the Philadelphia Convention, said at the Virginia
ratifying convention that enlightened people agreed that "the
superior dispatch, secrecy, and energy ... render it more politic to
vest the power of executing the laws in one man .... 167 Charles
Pinckney similarly claimed that because the people would elect the
"first magistrate," the executive department would be infused with
"that degree of vigor which will enable the President to execute the
laws with energy and despatch [sic]."168 Federalist Noah Webster
asserted that "where laws govern, and not men, the supreme
magistrate should have it in his power to execute any law, however

163. See 1id. at 21.
164. Id. at 110.
165. 2 id. at 75.
166. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, 4 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 432, 444
(Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
167. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA
201 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1987) [hereinafter DEBATES].
168. Id.
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'
unpopular, without hazarding his person or office."169
William
Davie, at the North Carolina convention, sought to assuage those
who feared the Congress. Even if federal legislators were the "most
vicious demons that ever existed," and plotted against the liberties
of America, "all their machinations will not avail if not put in
execution. By whom are their laws and projects to be executed? By
the President."170 Davie stressed the importance of selecting the
executive by rhetorically asking "[i]s not this government a nerve171
less mass, a dead carcase [sic], without the executive power?"
While discussing the veto, other Federalists noted the President's
central role in law execution. Writing as "A Landholder," Oliver
Ellsworth claimed that "if lawmakers in every instance, before their
final decree, had the opinion of those who are to execute them, it
would prevent a thousand absurd ordinances ....
" Massachusetts
Governor James Bowdoin likewise noted that the President's
proposed veto served the same role it did for the Massachusetts and
New York governors.' 3 The veto safeguarded executive independence and "preserve[d] a uniformity in the laws which are
committed to them to execute."' 7 4
Though Anti-Federalists split on the desirability of the veto, they
agreed that the President could execute the law. "The Federal
Farmer" admitted that granting the President "a share in making
the laws, which he must execute"1 75 was perfectly sound. "A Federal
Republican" claimed that absent a veto, Congress would know no
bounds.176 In contrast, Presidents would be limited by the content
of the laws. "To execute [laws] when made, is limited by their
existence.' 7 7 Others, such as "Republicus," complained that the

169. Noah Webster, A Citizen of America, in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF
THE "OTHER" FEDERALISTS 373, 380 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDoweU eds., 1998)
(emphasis omitted).
170. 4 DEBATES, supranote 167, at 58; see also 2 id. at 353 ("The Union is dependent on the
will of the state governments for its chief magistrate ....
");THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 255
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
171. 4 DEBATES, supra note 167, at 58.
172. ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 158 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,

1892).
173. 2 DEBATES, supra note 167, at 128.
174. Id.

175. 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 11, at 314.
176. 3 id. at 83.
177. Id.
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"supreme conservator of laws"1 78 also enjoyed legislative authority.
Despite his "modest title," the President could "exercise the
combined authority of legislation, and execution....""'
Others emphasized the importance of presidential independence
for law enforcement. The Anti-Federalist who wrote "Essays by a
Farmer" argued that if the executive lacked a long term of office, "he
[could] never oppose large decided majorities of influential
individuals-or enforce on those powerful men ... the rigor of equal
law, which is the grand and only object of human society."'18
Continuing, the "Farmer" noted that "a properly constituted and
independent executive,-a vindex injuriarum-an avenger of public
wrongs ... [could] enforce the rigor of equal law on those who are
otherwise above the fear of punishment."''
Federalists and Anti-Federalists also understood that the
President would superintend executive officers. Alexander Hamilton
wrote that "[t]he administration of government," in "its most usual
and perhaps in its most precise signification," lies "within the
province of the executive department."'8 2 Conducting foreign
negotiations, preparing budgets, disbursing funds in conformity
with appropriations, and directing war efforts-these and other
related matters of a like nature were executive functions:
The persons therefore, to whose immediate management these
different matters are committed, ought to be considered as the
assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate; and, on this
account, they ought to derive their offices from his appointment,
at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his
superintendence."
At the North Carolina convention, William Maclaine confirmed
Hamilton's claim that the Chief Executive would direct the assistant
executives.1' Some feared that federal tax collectors would oppress
North Carolinians and that impeachment would be the only means
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

5 id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 42 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted).
THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Id. at 486-87.
4 DEBATES, supra note 167, at 46.
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of redress.'8 5 Maclaine responded that if the revenue officers
oppressed, the President was to be held responsible:
The President is the superior officer, who is to see the laws put
in execution. He is amenable for any maladministration in his
office. Were it possible to suppose that the President should give
wrong instructions to his deputies, whereby the citizens would
be distressed, they would have redress in the ordinary courts of
common law."
At the same convention, James Iredell similarly attested to the
President's preeminent enforcement role. 'The office of superintending the execution of the laws of the Union is an office of the utmost
importance."'8 7 Even some Anti-Federalists recognized the advantages of executive superintendence. The Federal Farmer argued
that history and reason had taught that lawmaking should be left
to plural legislatures." Law execution, however, was best entrusted
"to the direction and care of one man."'8 9 A single executive seemed
"peculiarly well circumstanced to superintend the execution of laws
with discernment and decision, with promptitude and uniformity
....7)"90 Presumably, the chief executive would ensure wise, prompt,
and uniform law execution by "direct[ing]" subordinate executives.' 9 '
There was little controversy about the law execution power
because all understood that such authority was a sine qua non of
successful government. James Wilson rhetorically asked why "give
the power to make laws, unless they are to be executed? and if they
are to be executed, the executive and judicial powers will necessarily
be engaged in the business. ' Similarly, "A Jerseyman" thought
opponents of the Constitution's creation of an independent executive
were bizarre, observing that it would be "highly ridiculous to send

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 106.
2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 11, at 310.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2 DEBATES, supra note 167, at 461; see also id. at 469.
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representatives ... to make laws for us, if we did not give power to
some person or persons to see them duly executed."' 93
After the Constitution's creation, there were some in Congress
who denied that those who executed the law ought to be understood
as the President's subordinates. In the famous Decision of 1789,
some representatives suggested that department heads were
removable by the President only when the Senate concurred;'9 4
others argued that impeachment was the sole means of removing
officers.' 95 But Madison and many others demurred, asserting that
because the President was empowered to execute the law and was
made responsible for a faithful execution, the better reading of the
Constitution was that the President could remove unilaterally.'9 6 As
Madison put it, "[i]s the power of displacing, an executive power? I
conceive that if any power whatsoever is in its nature executive, it
is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who
execute the laws.' 97 The Madisonian view prevailed, with Congress
implicitly recognizing a presidential power to remove executive
officers in three separate statutes.'9 8 Consistent with this congressional construction of the Constitution, early Presidents removed
numerous officers, both grand and minor, using their constitutional
authority. After all, no statute authorized such removals.'9 9
Some modern scholars have argued that whatever the scope of
the President's removal authority, the President was not seen as
193. 3 THE DOCUMENTARYHISTORYOFTHE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 149 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1978).
194. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 389 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1789).
195. Id. at 387.
196. Id. at 389.
197. Id. at 463; see also id. at 500.
198. CompareAn Act for Establishing an Executive Department, To Be Denominated the
Department of Foreign Affairs, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28, 29 (1789) (providing that the Chief Clerk
would have custody of all departmental papers "whenever the said principal officer shall be
removed from office by the President of the United States"), with An Act to Establish the
Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 7, 1 Stat. 65, 67 (1789) (providing that the Assistant to the
Secretary of the Treasury would have custody of all departmental papers "whenever the
Secretary shall be removed from office by the President of the United States"), and An Act To
Establish an Executive Department, To Be Denominated the Department of War, ch. 7, § 2,
1 Stat. 49, 50 (1789) (providing that an inferior officer would have custody of all departmental
papers "whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of
the United States").
199. Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1799, 1827-30
(2006).
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empowered to control all federal law execution. Indeed, some
scholars have insisted that early Congresses created various
independent departments and agencies, thus indicating that federal
legislators did not believe that all law execution had to be under
presidential control.2 °0 Early practice proves that the theory of the
unitary executive is a myth, or so say the theory's critics. Some have
claimed that the Treasury Department in particular was an
independent department outside of the executive branch.20 1 Others
have argued that the U.S. attorneys were free agents, not under
presidential control.20 2
These claims are rather unfounded. At the most basic level, they
are assertions backed by nothing other than doubtful readings of
early statutes. Though the statutes never purported to create
nonexecutive departments and never granted any administrative
autonomy, scholars have confidently read them as doing both.20 3
Unlike modern statutes, which expressly proclaim that various
entities are "independent" of the executive branch (and hence the
President), 20 4 no early statute ever declared that an officer or
department would be "independent" of the President.

200. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1994). Professor Peter Strauss has a more nuanced position. He
claims that the President may not displace decisions made by executive officers because the
Constitution merely makes the President a Chief Overseer. See Peter Strauss, Overseer or
"The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 703-04
(2007). In other words, the Constitution does not empower the President to execute all laws
himself or to direct the execution of laws by others. Professor Strauss's argument is based on
his reading of the Constitution's text. As the arguments in this Article indicate, the Founders
read the text quite differently. For a more detailed discussion of Professor Strauss's claim, see
Saikrishna Prakash, The EssentialMeaningof Executive Power, 2003 ILL. L. REV. 701,805-08.
201. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 200, at 71-72.
202. See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 581-82; William B.
Gwyn, The Indeterminacyof the Separationof Powers and the FederalCourts, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 474, 492-93 (1989); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law
Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989); Stephanie A.J.
Dangel, Note, Is Prosecutiona Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers'
Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1070 (1990).
203. See, e.g., Lessig & Sustein, supra note 200, at 30-31.
204. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (2006) ("[Ain independent counsel appointed under this
full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and
chapter shall have ...
prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice [and] the Attorney

General.").
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Moreover, if early practice is the proper means of judging the
soundness of the theory of the unitary executive, that practice
unequivocally favors the theory. George Washington directed
executive branch officials in a whole host of ways. He ordered
attorneys to prosecute and to stop prosecutions." 5 He issued general
instructions to executive branch officers even where he had no
statutory authority to do so.20 6 According to Leonard White,
Washington made "[alll major decisions in matters of administration., 20 7 He did all of this pursuant to his belief that the Constitution
made him the Chief Executive, empowered to direct the execution
of law and under a duty to ensure a faithful execution. As Washington himself said, "[t]he impossibility that one man should be able to
perform all the great business of the State, I take to have been the
reason for instituting the great Departments, and appointing
officers therein, to assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the
duties of his trust. ' 20 8 In other words, the executive officers existed
to assist the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers.
In Leonard White's view, Washington regarded the Secretaries as
"assistants,not as rivals or substitutes. 2 °9
When we examine the Treasury Department and other supposedly independent entities, it is clear that Washington directed
their operations and law execution. According to historian Leonard
White, Hamilton (like all department heads) never "settled any
matter of importance without consulting the President and
securing his approval. 210 Washington was hardly shy about
directing his Treasury deputy; the chief executive regularly
conveyed his approval or disapproval of Hamilton's plans or actions.
For instance, he advised Hamilton on the structure of an agency
that would collect revenue.2 ' Moreover, Hamilton's famous opinion
on the Bank of the United States was written in response to an

205. Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor,73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 553-58 (2005).
206. See Prakash, supra note 200, at 804-05.
207. LEONARD WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 27 (1956).
208. Letter from George Washington to Elanor Frangois lie, Conte de Moustier (May 25,
1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, June 1788-Jan. 1790, at 333, 334 (John
C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
209. LEONARD WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS 27 (1948).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 33.
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"order" from Washington.2 1 2 White observes that when it came to the
executive branch, a branch that included all the government
agencies, Washington was the "undisputed master. 2 13
B. Modern Framework: The Splintering of the Unitary Executive
The early dispute between those who saw a minimal role for the
President in law execution and the original unitary executivists,
such as Madison and Washington, presaged more serious conflicts
that surfaced a generation later and that still reverberate today.
Although Presidents Adams and Jefferson continued to direct law
execution without facing any constitutional challenges to their
actions, their remote successor, Andrew Jackson, faced considerable
criticism from partisan Senate critics. After Jackson removed his
disobedient Treasury Secretary, James Duane, and directed his
successor to remove federal deposits from the Bank of the United
States, the Senate resolved, by a vote of twenty-six to twenty, that
the President had assumed authority in derogation of the Constitution and laws of the United States. 214 A friendly Senate later
expunged this resolution.2 1
What is interesting about this episode is that a majority of the
Senate either believed that Jackson lacked the authority to remove
the Treasury Secretary, at least under the circumstances of the
case, or that Jackson could not direct the Treasury Secretary to
remove the deposits. Earlier versions of the censure were more
detailed in the criticisms.21 6 Given the more general language of the
final resolution, we cannot say precisely what raised the hackles of
the Senate majority.21 7
212. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionalityof an Act To Establish a Bank,

in PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 14, 14 (Paul Brest & Sanford Levinson
eds., 3d ed. 1983).
213. WHITE, supra note 209, at 37.
214. See ROBERT REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR 141 (1967).
215. Id. at 174.

216. See, e.g., 10 REG. DEB. 58 (1834) (first resolution of Henry Clay) (claiming that
President Jackson had assumed power over the Treasury not granted by the Constitution and
laws of the United States and that he had improperly dismissed the Treasury Secretary and
ordered removal of the Bank's deposits).
217. In the debates preceding the censure's expunging, critics pointed out that the final
censure resolution was rather vague and ambiguous as compared to earlier versions. See 13
REG. DEB. 380-81 (1837) (resolution of Senator Thomas Hart Benton).
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Equally telling is that Jackson apparently did not believe that he
could order subordinate Treasury officials to withdraw the deposits.
Though the statute authorized the Treasury Secretary to withdraw
federal funds, it did not suggest that the Treasury Secretary was
the only official capable of removing deposits.21 8 After all, other
Treasury officials presumably would carry out whatever decision the
Secretary might make. Given that other executive officers could
withdraw the funds (even if they could not make the decision to do
so), President Jackson might have concluded that he could order
these executive officers to withdraw the funds using his constitutional authority. Armed with the executive power, the President
might have assumed that he could order subordinate Treasury
officials to withdraw the funds, whatever the statute or the
Treasury Secretary might say.
Because Jackson did not order subordinate Treasury personnel to
withdraw the funds, one reasonably might infer that Jackson
believed that he lacked the constitutional authority to order the
removal of the Bank's deposits. Jackson might have felt that
although he had a right to expect the Treasury Secretary to adhere
to his orders, he lacked a constitutional right to make decisions
statutorily committed to the Treasury Secretary.21 9 If Jackson
believed that he lacked the authority to direct Treasury subordinates to remove the deposits, it was an early departure from the
original conception of the President as the executor of all federal
law, with executive branch personnel merely acting as his assistants.
In a repudiation of the Decision of 1789,22 various Congresses
also enacted Tenure of Office Acts that made it more difficult for the
President to remove some officials. The most infamous, the 1867
Tenure of Office Act, required the President to obtain the Senate's
consent prior to removing certain officers. 2"' The House famously

218. See An Act To Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 44,
§ 16, 3 Stat. 266, 274 (1816).
219. Arguably, Jackson would not have given Treasury Secretary Duane days to decide
whether Duane would order the deposits withdrawn had Jackson believed that he could order
subordinate Treasury officials to withdraw the deposits. See REMINI, supra note 214, at 12124.
220. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
221. 14 Stat. 430, ch. 154.
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impeached President Andrew Johnson, 22 and the Senate came
within one vote of ousting him from office. The principal charge was
that Johnson unilaterally removed War Secretary Edwin Stanton in
contravention of the supposed statutory requirement that the
223
Senate concur in the removal prior to its taking effect. Congress
224
eventually repealed the 1867 Tenure of Office Act.
Apart from its decisions to constrain presidential removals,
Congress has created independent federal agencies. According to
Robert Cushman, the first clear case of this occurred during the late
nineteenth century, with the creation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.22 5 Although that Commission was abolished in 1995,226
numerous other independent agencies populate Washington, D.C.
The list of independent agencies includes such prominent agencies
as the Federal Reserve, the Federal Election Commission, and the
Federal Communications Commission.22 7
What makes these entities "independent" is their placement
outside the orbit of direct presidential control.228 Sometimes, statutes designate these agencies as "independent."2 29 More important
than any such designation, however, are the structure of these
agencies and the tenure of their commissioners. To begin, commissioners have fixed, staggered terms that have no relationship to
presidential elections. 2 0 Relatedly, commissioners typically do not
serve at the pleasure of the President because the organic statutes
usually limit removal to situations in which the President has
"cause" for removal. 231 Although the exact contours of "cause" are

222. 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT
BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 2 (Gov't Printing

Office 1868).
223. 2 id. 486-87.
224. An Act To Repeal Certain Sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States
Relating to the Appointment of Civil Officers, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500 (1887).
225. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 19 (1941).

226. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 101, 109 Stat. 803, 804.
227. See Anne Joseph O'Connell, PoliticalCycles of Rulemaking: An EmpiricalPortraitof
the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REv. 889, 899 & n.19 (2008).
228. See Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 43-44.
229. See, e.g., 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2000) (listing various agencies as "independent
regulatory agenc[ies]").
230. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (2006) (creating staggered terms for SEC commissioners).
231. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) (providing that the President may remove FTC
commissioners for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office").

1056

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1021

not clear, many suppose that the President may not remove
someone protected by a for "cause" restriction merely because
the President wishes to appoint someone else who shares the
President's policy preferences.2 32 Finally, Congress typically requires
that agencies be composed of some members of the opposition party,
thus increasing the chance that some members will have preferences that vary from the appointing President's presumed preferences. 233 The end result is that commissioners of these agencies and
commissions do not regard themselves as subordinate to the
President, and Presidents typically do not believe that they are
entitled to direct these commissioners.2 3 4

232. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that
President Franklin Roosevelt could not remove Federal Trade Commissioner Humphrey based
on mere policy differences).
233. DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 3-4 (2003).
234. As many have pointed out, these commissioners are not wholly oblivious to
presidential suasion and pressure. First, commissioners may tend to favor the policies of the
President who appointed them and thus act in ways that are consistent with presidential
policies. Neal Devins and David Lewis have suggested that the President's ability to appoint
permits him to wield significant influence over those commissioners he appointed, especially
in an era of party polarization. Neal Devins & David Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies:
Party Polarizationand the Limits of InstitutionalDesign, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 462 (2008).
Once the President appoints a majority of commissioners from his own party, his preferences
are likely to prevail. Second, commissioners may wish to curry favor with the President in
order to secure a reappointment or a new office somewhere else in the government. Third,
Presidents often have an electoral mandate that makes others, including members of
Congress and nominally independent commissioners, pay heed to their agendas. Fourth, the
agency may be more reticent to defend its independence if it lacks powerful benefactors in
Congress who will call the President to task for his attempts to interfere with the agency's
decision making. Finally, the customary relationship between an independent agency and the
White House, plus the individual proclivities of the President and the commissioners, may
make it easier (or more difficult) for the President to sway commissioners. Professor Devins
documents how the EEOC, which had some of the hallmarks of an independent agency,
yielded to White House pressure on various affirmative action policies. See Neal Devins,
PoliticalWill and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent,
15 CARDozo L. REV. 273, 285-92 (1993).
All in all, though this Article lumps all independent agencies together, it is perhaps better
to think of independent agencies as existing along a continuum, some more independent of
presidential preferences than others. Where a particular independent agency rests on the
continuum will change over time given White House aggressiveness, agency assertiveness,
congressional vigilance, and the composition of the commission. It also seems fair to say that
executive departments and agencies can likewise be placed on a spectrum, with some under
more watchful presidential control and others at greater liberty to act at variance with
presidential policies.
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None of these constraints on removal would matter if these
independent agencies did not wield any executive power. In fact, the
independent agencies routinely execute the law against those who
have violated federal statutes and agency rules.23 Although they
cannot bring criminal charges,23 they can bring cases for civil
violations of federal statutes.2 3 7 For instance, the SEC and the FEC
regularly charge individuals and companies with violating federal
law, thus serving as independent prosecutors of certain civil
violations.23
The end result is that law execution is fractionalized in ways
that go beyond even Edmund Randolph's vision of a triumvirate
executive. To be sure, the nation lacks a set of plural, coequal
executives who must work in tandem to accomplish anything. Nor
do we have a Chief Executive checked in all major matters by an
executive council. Instead, we have something of a subdivided
executive branch, with the distribution of executive power fragmented across particular laws.
Although the President has the executive power over many laws
because the execution of such laws is wholly committed to the
executive branch, the President lacks the executive power over other
laws related to certain civil violations. The executive power over
execution of civil securities laws is committed to the five-member
SEC.23 9 Execution of communication laws is committed to the fivemember FCC.240
In effect, we have multiple chief executives where the original
Constitution contemplates one. We have one chief executive with
partial control of law execution and multiple executive councils
granted a limited jurisdiction over particular civil violations. At the
235. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Departmentof Justice Control
of Federal Litigation,5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 561-65 (2003).
236. Id. at 561-62.
237. Id. at 564-65.
238. Id. Their litigational independence is somewhat curbed by their inability to argue

their cases before the Supreme Court. Should an independent agency wish to appeal a
judgment to the Supreme Court, it must convince the Justice Department to seek certiorari.
See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (2008). Moreover, if a judgment favorable to the independent agency is
heard by the Supreme Court, the Justice Department represents the government. See 28
U.S.C. § 518 (2006). Still, most civil cases never make it to the Supreme Court, and hence, the
independent agencies have control over the vast majority of civil cases that they prosecute.
239. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2006).
240. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
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founding no one imagined that Congress might so fractionalize and
distribute the executive power, creating numerous chief executives.
Apart from the interesting and unforeseen division of the executive power, the President no longer takes care that all federal
law is faithfully executed. Modern Presidents have long acquiesced
to congressional statutes that splinter the executive power, doing
nothing more than occasionally vetoing the creation of new agencies
that would usurp yet another sliver of executive power. 241 As a
result of this lax approach, Presidents (and their assistants) pay
little or no attention to the prosecutions brought by the independent
agencies and thus have no way of knowing whether these agencies
are faithfully executing the laws. Contemporary Presidents are
essentially derelict.
Although much has been written about the independent agencies,
typically lost in all the commentary about the unconstitutionality of
such agencies is a true sense of the sweep of the argument favoring
their constitutionality. If it is constitutional for Congress to create
these independent executive councils, it is equally constitutional
for Congress to make all of law execution independent of the
President. Nothing about the independent agencies, such as the
Federal Communications Commission, marks them as any different
from any of the agencies Congress has chosen to situate within the
executive branch. Hence, if the Federal Election Commission can be
independent, so can the Environmental Protection Agency, Health
and Human Services, even the Justice Department.24 2 In this way,
Congress might wholly neuter what Hamilton called the "constitutional executor" of federal laws.243
Going further, Congress might vary the structure of these
independent entities. First, it might choose to have these agencies
241. See, e.g., LEWIS, supranote 233, at 86-87 (stating that although President Ford vetoed
the creation of a new independent consumer agency, three other independent commissions
were created during his administration).
242. One might believe that the Department of Defense is different because the
Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief, and hence, one might suppose
that Congress cannot make that Department independent. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Yet, this argument might only hold water with respect to the military officers and does not
apply to any of the civilian apparatus charged with ordinary law execution relating to
procurement, personnel, etc. Moreover, if "the Supreme Executive" can be a neutered
executive, it is not clear why Congress would have any less power over the Commander in

Chief.
243. Hamilton, supra note 166, at 444.
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headed by a single administrator, rather than by an executive
council. If the Constitution authorizes Congress to create independent agencies charged with executing the law, there is no reason to
suppose that these agencies must be superintended by a plural
council as opposed to a single chief executive.
Second, Congress might create various independent agencies that,
though independent of the President, are answerable to a statutory
chief executive. Once again, if the Constitution authorizes Congress
to create independent executive agencies, there is no reason to
suppose that these agencies cannot be collectively superintended by
a chief administrator who ensures that agencies pursue a consistent
set of policies and do not act at cross-purposes. Congress might
provide that the chief administrator could remove the heads of the
independent agencies at will, thereby ensuring that regardless of
who appointed them, the chief administrator would have tremendous influence and control over the independent agencies. In this
way, Congress might both wholly insulate law execution from
presidential control while still ensuring that there is some general,
system-wide oversight of how various executive officers enforce
federal laws. In short, if Congress can create independent executives, it can create an ersatz chief executive who, although not a
constitutional executor of the laws, would be a statutory executor of
all laws, thereby supplanting the Constitution's Chief Executive.244
CONCLUSION

We live in odd times. On the one hand, many members of the
commentariat believe that the presidency has metastasized into an
imperial juggernaut, domineering the other branches and standing
astride the entire nation.24 5 On the other hand, a few members of
the Administration and some members of the legal academy believe

244. Of course, the President would have the power to nominate this statutory chief
administrator. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This would seem to give the President indirect
influence on how laws were executed. Still, if Congress granted the chief administrator a
sufficiently long term, a President might not be able to nominate a chief administrator and
would be saddled with a holdover chief administrator.
245. See supra note 2.
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that Congress
has usurped powers properly resting with the
24 6
President.
Both camps have elements of the truth on their side, at least if we
use the Constitution's original meaning as a baseline. In the modern
presidency, we have something of a monarch and something of a
cipher. When it comes to war and the military, we have an imperial
system where the President may declare war and may ignore
statutes that he believes violate his Commander in Chief power.2 4 v
In these areas, the President is somewhat of a juggernaut, far
brawnier than any member of the founding generation imagined
that he should be.
When it comes to the execution of certain laws, however, the
President is a hapless cipher, a bystander who has neither the
knowledge nor (seemingly) much interest in gauging whether
certain laws are being properly executed in a manner ensuring
uniformity, promptness, and vigor. 2" Neither the President nor any
members of his administration has much idea of how executives
within the independent agencies are enforcing various laws.
In a way, these divergent outcomes were foreseen. Edmund
Randolph, speaking at the Philadelphia Convention, had predicted
that the President would be a "foetus of a Monarchy. 2 49 His
prediction seems rather true with respect to war powers. Modern
Presidents claim and exercise war powers that were commonly
associated with the most powerful monarchs of Europe.
At the same time, James Madison warned long ago that the
legislative branch would be an "impetuous vortex., 25 0 Rather than
attempting to assume executive power directly, Congresses have
systematically weakened the executive branch's control over law
execution by making it far more difficult for the President to direct
the law execution that occurs in the various independent agencies.
By erecting obstacles to presidential control of independent
agencies, Congresses have made it easier for legislators to influence
them. After all, Congress still enjoys the funding power, may hold
246. See supra notes 24-28.
247. See supra Part I.B.

248. See supra Part II.B.
249. Notes of Major William Pierceon the FederalConventionof 1787,3 AM. HIST. REV. 310,
322 (1898).
250. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 34, at 333.
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embarrassing hearings, and may alter or diminish the agency's
powers. Little wonder that independent agencies are extremely
solicitous of members of Congress. As Madison predicted, Congress
has "mask[ed] under complicated and indirect measures, the
encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments."2 5 '
In The Federalist No. 70, Hamilton discussed the ways in which
executive unity might be destroyed, listing two possibilities: "either
by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity
and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in
whole or in part to the controul and co-operation of others, in the
capacity of counsellors to him."2" 2 In either case, dissension would
enervate the executive branch and would "serve to embarrass and
weaken the execution" of legislative measures.2 53 Ingenious
Congresses have discovered a third way: enact statutes that vest
portions of the executive power in various multimember, independent agencies.254
Although Congress deserves the lion's share of the blame (or
credit) for this state of affairs, modern Presidents also bear some
responsibility. In a sense, they have decided to vigorously assert
powers that are not theirs in the war and military arena, while
largely turning a blind eye to the fragmentation and division of
executive power by Congress across the independent agencies.
Presidents seem to largely accept the reduction in their law
execution power, preferring to make grand claims about the
initiation and prosecution of wars.
The courts also have played a role in ushering in our curious
state. When it comes to independent agencies and entities, the
courts have held that various statutory constraints on presidential
control are constitutional.2 55 Because the judiciary is the 800-pound
gorilla of constitutional law, Presidents and their administrations
have acquiesced to the judiciary's constitutional conclusions. Where
war powers are concerned, however, the courts generally have shied
away from declaring that the President lacks the power to wage war
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
States,

Id.
THE FEDERAliST No. 70, at 472-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Id. at 475.
See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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absent a congressional declaration of war. Given the absence of
judicial constraints in one area and their conspicuous presence in
the other, one cannot be surprised that Presidents have pushed the
envelope in one area and have accepted the judiciary's limits in the
other.
The picture sketched here perhaps mirrors the claims of Aaron
Wildavsky that we have 'Two Presidencies," one in matters of war
and foreign affairs and one in matters of domestic policy.256
Wildavsky argues that Presidents have more success in Congress
when seeking foreign policy/war legislation than when seeking
domestic legislation.2 5 7 His thesis has since been contested."'
Whatever the truth of the matter, when we compare the Constitution's original understanding with modern practice, we do seem to
have 'Two Presidencies."
What are we to make of our modern presidency-part imperial,
part cipher? Understandably, reactions will vary. Originalists may
argue for a return to the original conception of presidential powers.
Others may suggest that we should strengthen the President's
control of "law execution," while leaving the working allocation of
war powers undisturbed. Though it will strike some as odd, others
may wish for a still stronger warmaking President and a much
weaker law enforcement executive. The principal attraction of the
popular notion that the Constitution's meaning changes over time
is that we can refashion the Constitution to reflect our changing
preferences. The modern presidency reflects the living Constitution
perspective.2 5 s If the past is prologue, one can predict that conceptions of presidential power will continue to mutate.

256. Aaron Wildavsky, Two Presidencies,4 TRANS-ACION 7-14 (1966).
257. Id. at 8.
258. See, e.g., George C. Edwards III, The Two Presidencies:A Reevaluation, in THE TWO
PRESIDENCIES: A QUARTER CENTURY ASSESSMENT 101 (Steven A. Shull ed., 1991).
259. Cf. Michael D. Ramsey, PresidentialOriginalism?,88 B.U. L. REV. 353, 372 (2008)
(arguing that although the original Constitution did not permit the President to start a war,
the modern Constitution might).

